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Abstract 
I mean to isolate here one of the signature concepts ascribed to the music of John Cage, not only in 
the writings of historians and musicologists, but one to which the composer repeatedly linked his 
music: the concept of process. It is a noun that permeates much discourse surrounding the creative arts 
and perhaps paradoxically it might be that due to its ubiquity, musicologists feel little compulsion to 
clarify what they wish it to mean. It is, in a sense, a musicological problem that hides in plain sight. 
Composers in the 20th century began to use the term process, not as a mere descriptor of creative 
action but as a defining characteristic of their music. Cage was foremost amongst his contemporaries 
in this regard. The fact that the concept may constitute a differentiating stylistic feature of 20th century 
music is of less interest to me than the promiscuous coupling routinely engineered by commentators 
between the term and any number of disparate musical practices. However, that is less interesting still 
than the fact that Cage’s own use of the term offers an opportunity to discuss, in a systematic way, 
many of the musicological problems that Cage’s music raises and which it is the task of musicologists 
to try and answer. I shall explore the concept of process within the context of some of these issues. 
My thesis is that ‘process’ is habitually linked with the practice of Cage without sufficient regard its 
implications for our understanding of his music. Close analysis of the term will help elucidate some of 
the main features that characterise his work and may unearth tools that aid us in crafting answers to 
questions regarding authorship and ontology in the music of John Cage. 
‘If you begin, as I do, not with the notion of making objects, but the idea of making a process, 
and if that process is in fact, silent, which is to say the sounds are unwilled… then the silence 
takes on an entirely different significance. In other words, the music is evident constantly, 
whether there are sounds, or silences’ (Cage, 1963). 
Tudor as Musical Subject 
In 1951 John Cage composed Music of Changes for the pianist David Tudor with whom he had 
become recently acquainted. The exact circumstances of their first meeting are not clear, but in the 
decade that followed, composer and pianist fostered a working partnership that would become 
arguably the most significant to emerge from the American avant-garde. As Martin Iddon has rightly 
observed, had Cage and Tudor never met ‘it would probably have been impossible to speak of the 
‘New York School’ of composers – brief though that union may have been – and the history of post-
war music would surely have been radically, almost unimaginably different (Iddon, 2013a, p. 1).’ It 
was during this first decade of their association that the artistic ties binding composer and pianist were 
strongest. Although he continued to perform works by Cage, Tudor did not add any Cage pieces to his 
solo repertoire following the composition of Variations II in 1961 (2013a, p. xii).  What becomes 
clear from extant letters and interviews is that throughout the period from Music of Changes (1951) to 
Variations II (1961), Cage engaged Tudor to shape not only realisations of his scores but the aesthetic 
thinking from which those works were borne. What marked Cage and Tudor’s association as unique 
in the early development of post-war music was that Tudor became not only the interpreter but the 
subject of Cage’s compositions. Cage came to delight in formulating musical puzzles that demanded 
the forensic attention of this particular pianist’s very particular temperament. For Tudor was no mere 
passive executor of Cage’s compositional will. He addressed the often considerable challenges 
presented by Cage’s notation in ways often unforeseen by the composer. As a result, established 
concepts of authorship, musical work and performer became irrevocably blurred. For Cage, the work 
and the performer (usually Tudor) would become indistinguishable. Cage said of their first musical 
enterprise that ‘[a]t that time, [Tudor] was the Music of Changes ‘(Cage and Charles 1981, p. 178 as 
cited in Iddon, 2013a, p. 40). The strategies that Tudor devised for realising Cage’s scores would 
consequently have striking repercussions for Cage’s development as a composer. Cage’s devotion to 
Tudor the musician and the man, would provide impetus for Cage to cultivate his concept of 
‘composition as process’ which would, in turn, guide his experiments with musical indeterminacy. 
What follows is an examination of the Cagean theory of musical process; the way the composer 
experimented with implementing it in his work; Tudor’s role in shaping Cage’s conceptual and 
practical understanding of ‘process’ and its subsequent influence on Cage’s approach to 
indeterminacy.     
Misunderstanding Composition as Process 
Throughout the decade leading up to Variations II, Cage would state that his aim was to create 
compositions that were not musical objects in the European tradition as he saw it, but processes.1 
When invited by Alfred Steinecke to deliver a series of five seminars at the Darmstadt Summer 
School in 1958, Cage enthusiastically responded by telegram: ‘YES SUBJECT COMPOSITION AS 
PROCESS = CAGE +1’ (Iddon, 2013b).2 Tudor had been invited to accompany Stefan Wolpe to 
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Darmstadt in 1956 and was influential in bringing, not just Cage, but a whole generation of young 
American composers to the attention of the faculty (Beal, 2007). In 1958 Tudor returned with Cage 
and performed music by Cage, Christian Wolff, Stockhausen and Bo Nilsson during the seminars 
Cage gave there (2007, p. 81). It is not clear that the five seminars went ahead as Steinecke planned 
but we know that Cage, accompanied by Tudor, did in the end deliver a three-part lecture series under 
the heading Composition as Process (Iddon, 2013b). Cage was consistent in his devotion to process as 
the underlying philosophy of his music. Yet, for a number of reasons, the concept would garner much 
less attention from those attending his Darmstadt lectures than his use of chance operations.  
The three lectures comprising the series were titled Changes, Indeterminacy and Communication. The 
content of the lectures spoke to Cage’s aesthetic by providing his audience with both a conceptual and 
applied understanding of his art.  Cage related his ideas not only through the conventional semantic 
discourse common to all lectures, but by manipulating, according to chance procedures, the 
syntactical and morphological structures of his delivery of the text. For example, in his final lecture, 
Communication, Cage would periodically pause to light a cigarette, take a drag, extinguish the 
cigarette and then resume his lecture. Cage had, he said, formulated ‘by chance operations indications 
of when, in the course of performance, I am obliged to light a cigarette’ (Cage, 2011, p. 41). In Cage’s 
teaching the dialectic nature of theory and praxis is extinguished. He and Tudor are both practicing 
and preaching his message. Perhaps more significant than the, probably inevitable, scepticism that 
greeted Cage at Darmstadt was the misunderstanding of what he stood for.  Labels that were 
frequently bestowed upon his music by contemporaneous critics were ‘accident’, ‘freedom’ ‘Dada’ 
and, perhaps the most egregious contradiction of Cage’s aesthetic: ‘improvisation’ (Iddon, 2013b). 
That his lectures went some way to confusing his position could be blamed variously upon his 
audience, the composer himself and, as Iddon has pointed out, the sometimes misleading German 
translation of Cage’s texts (2013b, p. 216). Although posterity has granted Cage’s theories greater 
clarity and acceptance, the overarching theme that gave his Darmstadt lecture series its title, that of 
‘Composition as Process’, has received comparatively scant attention. In light of how Cage and Tudor 
conducted these lectures it is not surprising that what resonated most with observers was the 
performative aspect of his delivery and the seeming equanimity, or even indifference, with which 
Cage greeted all outcomes of the chance procedures he was using to construct his music and the 
content of his lectures. If Cage, the composer, was unwilling to exercise his artistic judgement in 
selecting and organising his materials then it is hardly surprising that some European critics were 
reluctant to engage their faculties in anything other than summary dismissals of the American 
interloper. “Today it’s only thanks to chance that he continues to ‘compose’”, sneered Antoine Goléa 
in response to Cage’s lectures. ‘Nothing is meaningful’, he continued, ‘only the current gag’ (Iddon, 
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2013b, p. 221). Critics such as Goléa found it difficult to reconcile themselves with the apparent 
meaningless that chance operations conferred upon Cage’s music. A consequence of their resistance 
to the apparent purposelessness of his music is that indeterminacy rather than process became the 
primary focus of discussions of Cage. The fixation upon chance was understandable. The composer 
had reinforced associations made between his concept of process and non-intention, disorder, and 
unpredictability. Cage had given the second of his three lectures the title ‘indeterminacy’ and it is true 
to say that indeterminacy was a recurrent theme of his presentations and was for many in attendance 
the most unorthodox feature, and therefore the main talking point, of his music. However, as 
evidenced by the overall title of the lecture series, indeterminacy was being used by Cage in service of 
a primary goal: ‘Composition as Process.’ Cage was not championing indeterminacy as a cause; he 
viewed it as a symptom of his faith in the true musical process that he was developing in tandem with 
Tudor. If we wish, therefore, to come to terms with how Cage’s music proposed to supplant the 
intolerable diktats of European orthodoxies, it is imperative to undertake a close examination of the 
‘process’ that Cage was advocating in 1958.  
Europe and Process 
In the twentieth century the term ‘process’ came to be regarded as a key feature of many disparate 
styles of musical practice. The concept proved to be unusually compatible with a range of competing 
schools of thought, finding a prominent role in discourse relating to the Second Viennese School, 
Darmstadt School, New York School, Minimalism plus any number of bifurcations, subsets or 
splinterings thereof. Indeed, an argument could be made that dedication to ‘process’ offered the 
closest thing to consistent feature of new music in a century of perennial renewal. The terms by which 
we might understand the fundamental nature of twentieth century musical process were not generally 
made explicit in the recorded views of composers or critics.3 In any case, it is important to note that 
both commentary and practice are not representative of a single point of view and thus will never be 
philosophically self-consistent. There is no doubt, however, that ‘process’ was regarded as a divisive 
feature of post war serial composition. We may infer two distinguishing features of the term as it was 
understood by those attending the Cage’s lectures in Darmstadt in 1958: 1. The suppression, to at least 
some extent, of the subjective will of the composer and 2: The fact that processes extend in time.  
The seemingly increased marginalisation of the subjective will in favour of formal processes was an 
increasingly contentious feature of the avant-garde. Concern had arisen amongst commentators that 
serial composers were playing the role of mere stenographers, responsible only for the dutiful 
cataloguing of a process played out at a remove from their artistic judgement. Ernst Thomas lamented 
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that Stockhausen’s Kontra-Punkte ‘follows an ordering principle, which is imprisoned by its material: 
he himself does not compose, rather he obeys the intellectually independent material’ (as cited in 
Iddon, 2013b, p. 98) Armin Schibler declared somewhat hysterically, ‘the work with rows threatens to 
become an abstract process which suppresses every declaration of humanity’ (as cited in Iddon, 
2013b, p. 98).  Critics responded to the rise of objective processes with scepticism, if not naked 
hostility. The primary asset for a composer of such music was not aesthetic flair and imagination but 
the rather dry fastidious attention to detail that normally accompanies a facility for numeracy and 
accurate transcription. For these critics, processes kept imagination, and even humanity, in abeyance 
functioning only in opposition to compositional will and the inspired spirit. Adorno advocated for 
creative intervention in the process, for the composer to subject the numerical systems to a certain 
amount of artistic inspiration (Iddon, 2013b).  The application of systems and procedures was 
characterised as a form of indentured servitude, if not outright imprisonment of the creative soul. 
Reservations about the pre-eminence of objective process over subjective will were not exclusive to 
critics and audiences. Referring to new music featured at Darmstadt in 1953/54, Boulez criticised the 
‘disparity between what was written and what was heard: there was no sonic imagination, but quite 
simply an accumulation of numerical transcriptions quite devoid of any aesthetic character’ (Boulez, 
1976, p. 64). Composers such as Boulez and Nono warned against the schematic sterility of process. 
‘Iddon writes ‘[I]t was precisely the ‘human element’ that Nono had sought to highlight directly 
against process –driven composition’ (Iddon, 2013b, p. 115). Formal systems common to serial 
music, the kind that necessitates the working through of mathematical operations, require that a set of 
rules be followed; what Douglas Hofstadter refers to as the ‘Requirement of Formality’ (Hofstadter, 
1979, p. 33). For critics of purely objective processes the resulting music is not so much created, but 
derived or produced as if by a machine. Processes also exist in nature in the absence of or sometimes 
in direct conflict with man: erosion or plate tectonics to give two examples. It is true to say that 
whether they are found in nature or in machines; processes are commonly unmoved, as Schibler 
warned, by ‘declarations of humanity’. 
In light of the accusations of inhumanity that encircled the Darmstadt school, it is critical to recognise 
that Cage’s commitment to process and his desire to suppress his will as a composer was not 
symptomatic of a wish to exclude human intervention from his music; quite the opposite. In the 
second of his Darmstadt lectures, Indeterminacy, Cage warned against music that is more ‘inhuman 
than human’ citing his composition Music of Changes as an offending example (Cage, 2009, p. 179). 
Although Cage had relied upon chance procedures when composing Music of Changes, the resulting 
score conformed to conventional notation practice in that it was fixed. The fact it had originated via 
‘inhuman’ chance operations, combined with the control that the determinate notation exerted upon 
the performer, lent the piece, Cage felt, an ‘alarming aspect of a Frankenstein monster (2009, p.179). 
Just as Cage was uncomfortable with the absolute authority exerted by European composers over their 
work, he was also discomfited by the similarly draconian hold the chance operations that gave rise to 
Music of Changes would have over any performance of the piece. The performer is, according to 
Cage, unable to identify with an immutable work whose nature had been determined prior to the 
performer’s knowledge of the score. The identity of the composition in either case is therefore bound 
up with the identity of the composer. Fixed scores whether constructed via chance operations or those 
more traditionally conceived, serve to exert control over the performer. Cage regards the imbalance 
that characterises the relationship of the composer and performer to a work as an appalling 
consequence of the European tradition; a consequence that the compositional processes of Music of 
Changes cannot escape. The performer of Music of Changes or a European masterpiece Cage says, is 
unable ‘to perform from his own centre but must identify himself insofar as possible with the centre of 
the work as written’ (2009, 179). Giving oneself over to a work in this manner is, for Cage, 
commensurate with submitting oneself to the tyranny of a dictator. Cage’s close collaboration with 
Tudor afforded him the opportunity to try and address these misgivings in his own work. He wished 
to compose music the performance of which was free of the spectre of tyrannical diktat or inhuman 
control. Cage’s solution: process. The noun ‘process’ is elusive, a skeleton key term that is a good fit 
for almost any set of actions directed toward the creation of an artistic work. It weighs heavy in the 
lexical toolkit of music commentators but is not often made sense of in its own right. 
Performing Process through Time 
Iddon suggests that the key feature that distinguished the American from the European composers was 
the American desire to move away from the composer as central figure in order to emphasise instead 
the role of the listener. The aim of the Americans, Iddon writes, ‘was to place the listener at the heart 
of the experience, seeking a unique hearing on behalf of each listener and dissolving distinctions 
between listening in ‘life’ and in ‘art’ (Iddon, 2013b, p. 214). It is noteworthy that of the human 
trichotomy associated with instrumental music– composer; performer; listener – the performer goes 
unremarked in Iddon’s summation of the American aesthetic. In response it might be argued that the 
term ‘listener’ does not preclude the performer from its gamut. Even if this is the case, subsuming 
performance within broader listenership diminishes the critical role performers (and Tudor in 
particular) played in shaping this music and the thought processes from which it grew. In his lectures 
Cage declared his desire to re-instate human experience in art (Cage, 2009, p. 179). The humanity 
Cage sought to mine, in creating his piano works at least, resided in the lived, indeterminate, 
experience of David Tudor. Cage did not agree with critics’ characterisation of the relationship 
obtaining between process and humanity as antithetical. He believed that, with regard to indeterminate 
music, that the ‘action of the players is productive of a process’ (2009, p. 184-185). Tudor himself 
was the resource upon whom Cage considered true musical process to be contingent. To fully 
understand the basis for this belief, it is necessary to turn from the concerns about the objectivity of 
musical processes to the second key identifying feature of processes: time. 
Perhaps the most incontestable feature of processes is that they persist in time. This persistence 
distinguishes both serial and Cagean process from the ‘inspiration’ so often regarded as the catalytic 
agent of Classical and Romantic composition. Inspiration is a subjective punctual occurrence in time 
most often associated with adjectives such as ‘flash’, ‘burst’ and ‘sudden’. Early biographies of 
Mozart were quick to cultivate the mythology that compositions were in the habit of appearing to him 
fully formed, and that his task as a composer was merely to transcribe these apparitions as and when 
they presented themselves (Solomon, 1995, p. 117). A process, such as those undertaken by Tudor in 
realising Cage’s often opaque scores, by contrast, emphasises extension through time. Processes 
attract wearisome adjectives like ‘lengthy’, ‘arduous’ and ‘tedious’, a requirement to work through a 
series of linear steps. Of course processes are not the only things that occupy time. Actions, events 
and states all have temporal qualities that seem intuitively distinct from processes. Attempts to devise 
a reliable system whereby we may differentiate processes from actions, events and states continue to 
generate philosophical debate beyond the scope of this paper. However, some of the debate around 
these theories may provide a useful lens through which to view Cage and Tudor’s collaborative work, 
perhaps bringing clarity to Cage’s misunderstood conception of musical process.  
Indeterminacy, Time and Process 
Discussion of time within Cage’s music is bound up with his use of indeterminacy. It was Cage’s 
evolving approach to indeterminacy, shaped throughout by his working relationship with Tudor, 
which was most illustrative of the composer’s dedication to process. As their musical association 
developed, beginning with Music of Changes (1952) and, to all intents and purposes, culminating with 
Variations II (1961), Tudor was increasingly afforded greater interpretative and, by extension, 
creative responsibility. It is instructive to examine this development in their professional relationship. 
Iddon has divided the Cage and Tudor working association into three roughly contiguous phases: 
determining the determinate; determining the indeterminate; (in)determining the indeterminate 
(Iddon, 2013a). These headings describe how chance elements gradually came to suffuse the entire 
continuity extending from composition through performance. To begin with Cage’s scores were fully 
determined. Tudor was required, with some help from mathematician Hans Rademacher, to devise 
formulae by which he could implement the unorthodox tempo markings presented in the score Music 
of Changes, but this was a question of interpretative strategy and did not satisfy Cage’s growing 
desire for truly open form. Iddon refers to this period in which Tudor was tasked with finding fixed 
solutions to fixed problems as ‘determining the determinate’ (2013a). 
It is evident from his lectures that Cage was keenly aware that the ‘chance operations’ that 
characterise his compositional approach in this period come burdened with finality. An operation 
connotes a goal or boundary after which the operation is no more. Cage came to look upon 
prescriptive scores, and the boundary they demarcated, as an encumbrance upon the performer, a 
suppression of individuality symptomatic of an authoritarian musical culture. From what he said on 
the matter, it is clear that he believed this burden, one imposed by fixed notation, could be lifted by 
the adoption of a true musical process. Given the term ‘process’ remains loaded with ambiguity it may 
be useful to apply increased precision to this discussion’s, thus far, rough outlining of its meaning.  
Efforts in the philosophical literature to systemise distinctions of verb-types such as ‘processes’, 
‘occurrences’, ‘events’, ‘states’, ‘achievements’ and ‘activities’ have rested largely upon linguistic 
factors; namely the time-schema implied by grammatical structure. Zeno Vendler proposed a system 
by which verb types were accorded membership of one of four ontological categories based primarily 
on whether the statement exhibited a continuous or non-continuous form (Vendler, 1957). Activities 
(run, push, swim) and states (desire, love, hate) are, Vendler said, identifiable by the presence of a 
continuous verb form. Accomplishments (run-a mile, compose a fugue) and achievements (recognise, 
find, win) are, by contrast, exhibitive of non-continuous verb-types. Achievements contain the 
implied culmination of an act and can be dated but do not, in Vendler’s system, have duration. 
Accomplishments have both duration and an implicit end point. States are not actions at all, they have 
no internal dynamic quality though they do endure over a stretch of time. Vendler’s ‘activity’ verb-
type category is closest to Cagean process in that activities, under this system, do not imply any 
anticipated upshot or fixed outcome. We might presume that Vendler would suggest ‘Composition as 
Activity’ as the appropriate title for Cage’s Darmstadt lectures. Other theorists have, however, taken 
issue with the classification of occurrences based on verb-types, claiming they can only be usefully 
applied in limited cases (Mourelatos, 1978). Consider the statements: 
(1.) David played a Mozart Sonata 
(2.) David played a little Mozart 
The verb ‘played’ is identical in both statements but the temporal nature of the predicate seems 
intuitively different. Sentence (1) contains the implied outcome that distinguishes an event. In 
sentence (2) the amount played is inherently indefinite, there is no presumed outcome attached 
suggesting it is a process or ‘activity’ predicate in the Vendlerian sense. In these examples, it is not 
the verb-type but the presence of a count or mass noun that determines the process/event character of 
the predicate. Examples of count nouns are dog, tree, book, sentence, sonata. They can be 
distinguished by the fact that they have a plural form that does not modify the meaning of the singular 
form; they can take the indefinite article ‘a’, ‘a tree’ ‘a sonata’; cardinal numbers, ‘two books’, ‘four 
dogs’; they may be subject to the informal version of the existential quantifier, ‘there is at least one’; 
and can be used with the adjectives ‘many’, ‘few’ ‘several.’ Mass terms like ‘snow’, ‘wine’ and 
‘music’ cannot be used with the adjectives ‘many’ and ‘few’. They cannot be pluralised without a 
modification of meaning: ‘the wines in the supermarket’ implies types of wine; nor can the modifying 
adjectives that are used with count nouns be applied to mass nouns, they take instead adjectives like 
‘little’, ‘much’, ‘few’, enough’ (Mourelatos, 1978). In sentence (1) the object, ‘a Mozart Sonata’, is a 
count noun, signifying, according to Geoffrey Leech, an event predication (as cited in Mourelatos, 
1978, p 424). Sentence (1) communicates an occurrence, a complete whole. In sentence (2) the verb-
object ‘a little Mozart’ is a mass noun, meaning we have a process predication on our hands. The 
sentence ‘He played a little Mozart’ alludes to an unbounded temporal quantity that Leech suggests 
could prompt the question ‘How long did you play?’ The question ‘How long did you play?’ does not 
fit the statement ‘I played a Mozart Sonata.’ You might inquire how long it took which signifies an 
occurrence in time rather than a process through time which the mass term implies. Leech’s system 
for distinguishing events and processes resonates with Tudor’s performances of Cage’s piano music. 
Earlier determinate works such as Music of Changes, Water Music and Two Pastorales fit Leech’s 
criteria for an event. The statement ‘David Tudor played Music of Changes’ is not syntactically 
different from ‘He played a Mozart Sonata.’ It would be more appropriate therefore to ask ‘How long 
did it take Tudor to play Music of Changes?’ than ‘How long did Tudor play Music of Changes?’ As 
with the Mozart example, if Tudor did not play the full score we cannot say that he had played Music 
of Changes, only that he had performed an extract as he often did during the lectures Cage delivered 
in Darmstadt. A true performance of Music of Changes is a punctual occurrence in time, predicated 
upon completion. It is, in short, an event. Tudor’s realisation of later works such as Solo for Piano 
(1957-58) from the Concert for Piano and Orchestra are more at odds with Leech’s definition of 
‘event’. Intrinsic to Solo for Piano is that there is no requirement for Tudor to perform the full score 
for us to be able to say that ‘He played Solo for Piano.’ Solo for Piano would be reconstituted in 
many forms in a variety of settings, functioning as accompaniment, a stand-alone work or as a solo 
part within an orchestral setting. Tudor’s preparatory sketches for the piece’s Town Hall premiere in 
New York plan for a duration of 23 minutes and 15 seconds (Iddon, 2013a, p. 73). Subsequent 
performances given at the Village Vanguard lasted less than five minutes (2013a, p.74). When Solo 
for Piano was documented in combination with the collection of stories Cage read for the recording 
titled Indeterminacy, Tudor had to find a way to match the ninety-minute duration of Cage’s 
monologue. Despite the extremes in duration that Tudor’s selective reading of the score permitted, it 
is not true to say that in any of these circumstances only a segment of Solo for Piano was performed. 
Holzaepfel pointedly arrests any impulse to categorise the shorter performances as extracts, referring 
to the Village Vanguard performances as ‘abbreviated forms of the plans for the Town Hall concert’ 
(as cited in Iddon, 2013a, p.74). As with the abbreviation of a word, though the structural integrity 
may change, none of the meaning (or the meaninglessness Cage’s case) is lost. Given the flexibility 
that is afforded time in Solo for Piano and the care Tudor takes in determining a range of durations for 
different settings it is not at all inappropriate to respond to the declaration ‘I played Solo for Piano’ 
with the question ‘How long did you play?’ The question ‘How long do I play?’ was foremost in 
Tudor’s mind in any given performance of the piece moving Solo for Piano closer to Leech’s 
definition of a process than an event.  
Cage’s music was returned to him by Tudor in sometimes unpredictable forms, often serving as a 
direct challenge to the aesthetic that Cage avowed. Tudor’s calculated and rigorous application to the 
unorthodox demands of these scores was such that it thoroughly tested the philosophical foundations 
upon which the music was built. The pianist’s actions repeatedly interrogated Cage’s philosophy, 
doubting that it might ever find its true expression in practice. Cage absorbed these lessons, 
continually revising his compositional approach in light of Tudor’s interpretations. In the pieces that 
followed Music of Changes and Two Pastorales, Cage was driven to shore up the perceived failure of 
the music to allow the pianist to ‘perform from his own centre.’ These failings were uncovered in 
large part by Tudor’s working practice. The composer-performer relationship in this instance was not 
conventionally linear but iterative; the outcome of each collaboration became input for the next, until 
the working relationship began to generate complex, indeterminate results. It was necessary for Cage 
to maintain a prolonged association with Tudor in order that these iterations could be played out and 
his aspirations of composition as unbounded process could be brought nearer fruition.      
It is a commonly held view that Tudor was engaged as a kind of solver of puzzles set by Cage and that 
the composer would devise scores containing challenges that would keep the pianist interested (Iddon, 
2013a, p. 67). Cage wrote his music in full knowledge of Tudor’s unwavering capacity for 
formulating methodical, focused and creative responses to any musical challenge that engaged his 
formidable intellect and pianistic skill. In recalling Tudor’s pervasive influence on the American 
avant-garde of the time and the daunting prospect of writing for someone of his preternatural talent, 
Christian Wolff observed that ‘when a piece was turned over to David, there was simply no anxiety. 
You didn’t worry, you knew that something would happen. My main anxiety would be more that I 
had made something that wasn’t good enough (to interest him) (Holzaepfel, as cited by Thomas, 
2010, p. 53).  Cage’s notation necessitated the application of a mind of considerable diligence and 
fastidiousness partly because Cage realised that Tudor had both in rare abundance. His work always 
took stock of Tudor’s capacities and proclivities. In 1981 Cage remarked:  
‘In all my works since 1952, I have tried to achieve what would seem interesting and vibrant 
to David Tudor. Whatever succeeds in the works I have done has been determined in 
relationship to him…. David Tudor was present in everything I was doing’ (Cage and 
Charles, 1995, p. 178).  
Tudor’s preparatory notes reflect the pianist’s commitment to determining solutions to Cage’s 
puzzles. In the case of Music of Changes, Tudor’s notes ran to more than 100 pages (2013a, p. 40). He 
never relented from this meticulous approach to preparing Cage’s scores. However, symptomatic of 
this score-as-puzzle approach to notation was that once Tudor ‘solved’ a puzzle, drawing up his own 
score from which he would perform, he would not revisit the Cage original in search of alternate 
outcomes (2013a). Cage’s score for Solo for Piano comprises eighty-four different types of notation, 
each with an accompanying letter or letters that are explicated by a key at the front of the score. 
Prefatory instructions direct that ‘a program made within a determined length of time (to be altered by 
a conductor, when there is one) may involve any reading, i.e. any sequence of parts or parts thereof’. 
Of the eighty-four notations, Tudor chose to interpret only those that were distinct. He eliminated 
repetitions or variations of notation types, thus reducing the total number to sixty three (Iddon, 2013a, 
p. 67). It seems that Tudor could see no point in expending further effort in search of solutions to an 
already solved puzzle. Given that Tudor was the de-facto performer of all of Cage’s keyboard works 
during this period, his determination of Cage’s indeterminate scores weakens their claims on process. 
It is true that any other performer could return to Cage’s notation and draft any number of varying 
interpretations, but these pieces were written for Tudor. They were, as Cage made clear, puzzles 
devised with one particular player in mind. 
What this meant for Cage was that his once indeterminate music would, just like those authoritarian 
works he censured, become determinate. In the works that followed Music of Changes, Cage himself 
took responsibility for the calculations that he had, in Music of Changes and Two Pastorales, 
entrusted to Tudor. In Water Music (1952) and 34’46.776” for a pianist (1954) he notated directly the 
temporal structure of the music so that performances could be realised from the original score. 
Perhaps by effectively abandoning the puzzles he set in Music of Changes, Cage was tacitly endorsing 
Tudor’s disinclination for revisiting solutions already provided to the questions posed by that 
particular score. It seems apparent therefore that Cage was not so much interested in the answers to 
the puzzles present in the notation of Music of Changes. Of interest, for Cage and Tudor were the 
steps taken in arriving at those answers, the process. Asking Tudor to perform the same procedures in 
determining the timing of events in subsequent compositions held little appeal. Though the parametric 
values may have been subject to change from piece to piece, the actions taken in determining the 
mensural structure from new variables would have remained the same. Working through the same 
procedures with different starting variables would result only in the challenge becoming a mere chore; 
not a means by which to hold Tudor’s interest.  
Events within a Process 
By ‘solving’ the riddles set by Cage’s ambiguous graphic notation and the often gnomic instructions 
with which they were accompanied, Tudor winnowed a field of possible actions to a single 
determined outcome. As both Vendler and Mourelatos have argued, in the backward shadow cast by a 
concluding action, process becomes event (Vendler, 1957: Mourelatos, 1978). The outcome of any 
given performance of these works is foreseen and repeatable. The resulting fixed scores moves away 
from the true process that Cage conceived and closer to what Lydia Goehr refers to as a nominalist 
conception of musical work (Goehr, 2007). Fixed notation sheds its internal dynamism, no longer 
admitting change, absenting musical works to a timeless realm and thus failing to fulfil the criteria of 
a truly boundless process.  
There is a further dichotomy illustrative of Cage’s consideration of events and process that exists 
within his music, one which should give us pause. It is readily apparent in Tudor’s realisations of Solo 
for Piano. In preparing Solo for Piano Tudor favoured notations that contain what he referred to as 
‘single-icti’ (Iddon, 2013a, p. 75).  Cage had introduced the term in the instructions for Water Music, 
directing the performer to articulate chords ‘as a single ictus.’ Cage meant for the performer to 
underscore the disconnected nature of the note aggregates punctuating the unfolding sonic environs, 
thus distancing his music from the antecedent-consequent phraseology that characterised European 
music. Tudor’s realisations are themselves exhibitive of Cage’s wish that his music be comprised of 
isolated moments in time. During his preparation of Music for Piano 1-20 (1952-53) Tudor adopted 
the habit of excising the empty sections of staves from the score. The note events that remained upon 
the page were surrounded by empty space giving a visual impression of the aural archipelago that 
Cage sought in performance. The remaining note aggregates do not endure or collectively describe 
continuity; they represent punctual occurrences within a persisting process. Tudor made this aesthetic 
central to his realisation of much of Cage’s music including Music for Piano 1-20, Winter Music and 
Solo for Piano (2013a, p. 51). The note events described in Tudor’s notation take time but do not 
persist in time. When preparing Cage’s score, Tudor fixed the timeless ‘icti’ chronometrically, 
necessitating the use of a stopwatch in performance. In so doing Tudor fulfils two of Vendler’s 
conditions for events, namely that they can be dated and that they do not endure.  
Although Tudor takes great care to emphasise the importance of event over teleology in Cage’s work, 
his realisations were stubbornly less accommodating of process. It seems Cage felt that by expanding 
the role of indeterminacy he might cast off the yoke of the composer’s authoritarian presence and 
move nearer his aim of composition as process. By Winter Music (1957) and Solo for Piano (1958) 
Cage had found ways of embedding indeterminacy within his scores. A combination of graphic 
notation and text instruction meant that it was left to Tudor to decide upon issues of structure and 
pitch content. As mentioned above, the structural flexibility that these works afforded meant that 
Tudor could tailor them to the changing practical requirements (often related to time restrictions) of 
any given performance situation. However, Tudor did not adopt the same situational flexibility when 
it came to atomistic questions of pitch identity and placement (proportionally speaking). Tudor’s habit 
of replacing the composer’s original scores with fixed staff notation presented a notable obstacle for 
Cage’s concept of composition as process. Where macro-structure could be adapted, micro features 
were largely determined and unyielding to changed circumstances. Restricting indeterminacy to 
questions of form was, in Cage’s opinion, a failure of practice over intent, a failing that he set out to 
redress in subsequent works.  
Overcoming Tudor’s determinism 
John Holzaepfel remarked that Solo for Piano acted as a kind of fulcrum about which Cage’s music of 
this period turned. It consolidated forms of notation that Cage had used up to Solo for Piano and 
anticipated those yet to come including Variations I (1958), Theatre Piece and Music for Amplified 
Toy Pianos (1960) (as cited in Iddon, 2013a, p. 83). The score for Variations I develops notation BV 
from Solo for Piano. Where the graphic is comprised of points and lines fixed upon the page in Solo 
for Piano, the score for Variations I is not yet fixed. It is made up of a set of six transparencies each 
bearing either straight lines or a set of points. The performer is invited to overlay the transparencies 
upon one another in order to generate a composite graphic from which pitches, their dynamic 
characteristics and their placement in time are determined. In Variations I Cage attempts to subvert 
Tudor’s practice of creating single fixed realisations of his work. He asks that the piece not be fully 
determined but that it should retain its potential for multiple outcomes. Tudor obligingly departed 
from convention and created a number of realisations, granting no one realisation pre-eminence over 
the others (2013a, p. 85). It is apparent that Cage was driven to create new strategies that would retain 
the indeterminate nature of process into the act of performance. While multiple realisations of a score 
contributed some amount of indeterminacy, it was limited in scope. A choice of which realisation to 
perform had to be made but that decision was made in advance of performance; the performance itself 
remained stubbornly fixed, known and impervious to chance. In his Indeterminacy lecture Cage 
expressed reservations about indeterminacy that was limited to questions of form. In a critique of 
Stockhausen’s Klavierstuck XI, a piece in which Stockhausen invited the performer to piece together 
fragments, Cage declared: ‘form unvitalized by spontaneity brings about the death of all the other 
elements of the work’ (Cage, 2009, p.177). Cage argued that indeterminate form has little bearing 
upon the material nature of a work. If, as is the case with Klavierstucke XI, the fragments are 
composed in an idiomatic way then the identity of the piece is foreseen, irrespective of what 
fragmentary shuffling takes place.  In the case of Klavierstucke XI, Cage is unequivocal, 
indeterminacy is ‘unnecessary, since it is ineffective’ (2009, p.178). Although the fragments of 
Kalvierstucke XI and Cage’s own Winter Music could be reconstituted in a number of ways, there is a 
factorial limit to the possible permutations. These works exist in multiple forms but, it could be 
argued, they do not succeed as process. They are, like the cat in Schrodinger’s thought experiment, a 
superposition of contradictory states, but, as with any cat, very much an object, not the process Cage 
was trying to compose. We must assume that although chance procedures had effectively distanced 
Cage’s music from many European conventions, he was not wholly satisfied with indeterminacy 
being shut out from the performance itself. 
Tudor and Time Brackets 
It is somewhat ironic that it was an innovation of the fastidious Tudor which provided the biggest leap 
toward indeterminacy in performance: the creation of the time bracket. Despite the care taken by Cage 
to the contrary, works that were bound by the conventions of traditional time notation, either in 
Cage’s original scores or latterly in Tudor’s realisations, put at risk the purposelessness that Cage 
worked hard to preserve. Unwanted perceptions, to which the listener of European music has been 
conditioned, such as climaxes and points of rest, would inevitably flood in to fill the imprint left by 
repeated performances of an unchanging score. The time bracket however, permitted events to occur 
anywhere within a designated period of time. As a single event could now potentially occupy an 
infinite number of points within a defined temporal space, it was free of any perceived obligation to 
syntactical structure. Given that the time bracket preserved its arbitrariness in perpetuity, the identity 
or meaning of a sounding note could not be bound up in its structural relations. Tudor’s growing 
willingness to relinquish compositional choices to the contingency of dynamic time-bound experience 
was further reflected in his use of electronics and his increased emphasis upon the physicality of 
performance. He began to notate actions rather than the sounds that might issue from those actions. 
As Iddon observes, this meant that Tudor’s realisations were less determined than would have been 
the case with earlier works. In Variations I Tudor allowed himself to choose ‘largely freely’ the 
beaters and points upon the piano casing that he would strike (Iddon, 2013a, p. 91). In Theatre Piece 
(1960) Tudor deliberately notated physical actions that were impossible to enact, leaving the activity 
of finding what was possible to the performance itself (2013a, p. 91). In Variations II Tudor 
experimented with amplifying the piano. His remarks concerning the use of amplification indicate an 
appreciation of the additional layer of indeterminacy that electronics afford and which he would 
explore further in his own work. He observed that ‘in performance the parameters can interact in 
unforeseen ways, & the performance becomes a process of constant invention & re-invention of the 
sound events’ (2013a, p.183). Iddon regards the system of live electronics and amplification that 
Tudor developed for Variations II as reflective of the pianist’s effective elevation at this point to co-
composer (2013a, p. 187). It may have been necessary to enact such a division of authorial labour in 
order to realise Cage’s aim of Composition as Process       
Tudor’s notation also began to preserve, rather than undermine, the unboundedness required of true 
process. As with Variations I, Music Walk (1958) expanded upon notation already used in Solo for 
Piano. More significantly it marked the point at which Tudor no longer, for the most part, resorted to 
rewriting Cage’s scores in fixed staff notation.4 Instead Tudor’s realisations comprise text instructions 
with accompanying time codes. The departure from staff notation would be maintained by Tudor 
through his work on Theatre Piece and Cartridge Music. It signals an effort by the pianist to retain the 
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   The exception being Music for Amplified Toy Pianos (1960) (Iddon, 2013, p. 138) 
indeterminacy of Cage’s notation into his own redrafted scores. Pritchett says of Music Walk that it 
‘had no existence as a score, but rather exists as a means of making scores – a compositional process 
handed over to the performer to execute’ (Pritchett, 1993, p. 128). Pritchett’s remarks concerning 
Music Walk are indicative of how Cage’s work was becoming, in Tudor’s hands, process in the true 
sense. Cage set out, he said, not to make objects but to show a process. It was a goal that did not 
immediately betray the obstacles in its path, but finally Cage’s compositions were removing the 
shackles of object-hood. For Cage, in his music there is no object, only open ended temporal 
experience.  
Conclusion 
Prior, at least, to Variations II it is true that the sound palette that Tudor draws from is distinctly 
Cagean while the morphological structure is a product of the pianist’s fastidious preparations. 
However if we are to make a case for Cage’s compositions achieving process-hood, it is Tudor’s 
temporally extended physical experiences that furnish the detail in any given composition and confer 
the process genus upon the music. In contradistinction to the view propagated by critics of the 
Darmstadt school, that musical process is inherently inhuman, it is the very fact of Tudor’s human-
ness that permits Cage’s music to fulfil the requirements of process. Cage tried to conceive of a 
methodology borne out of a concept of process; to think of the act of composition not as a catalogue 
of events but a more nebulous abstraction of time bound living. The theme is one of adaptation, 
evolution, change. Along the way identity is shed or transformed as it becomes filtered by the 
phenomenal experiences of the performer both on and beyond the concert platform. It is clear that 
Cage is more interested in how things unfold through time, than in how they fasten to the present 
moment. Time is articulated within experience. Time is relative, not objectively determined by a 
universal clock or the directions of a conductor, when there is one. It emerges from the 
interpenetration of collective endeavour. Cage cares not for unifying ‘departures and arrivals at no 
matter what point at no matter what time’ but the open confluence of process that remains truly 
indeterminate with respect to its performance. As a result of the trust each man was willing to place in 
the other’s artistic judgement, Cage and Tudor had by the time Cage wrote Variations II re-imagined 
the conventions of the composer-performer dynamic and the concept of the musical work. In 1984 
Cage wrote to Tudor soliciting Tudor’s co-operation for a proposed biography of the pianist. It would 
not, Cage wrote, be ‘a conventional biography but a togetherness of a variety of materials’ (Iddon, 
2013a, p. 194-195). Try, Cage continued, ‘to find your earliest memories. Then when they get thick, 
go year by year. In any case, I look forward to the process of bringing this work about you into 
existence (2013a, p. 195).This unconsummated project might have been the natural culmination of a 
body of work that strove to share the identity of its subject: David Tudor. In being warped by the 
instability of Tudor’s personal narrative, by his exploratory life of praxis, a composition, for Cage, 
became richer. It is not a Cage composition that is articulated in performance, nor is it philosophical 
positions regarding ego and chance. Performance presents the dynamic experience of the performer. 
The conceit of Cagean process was that the imperfections wrought by the flow of a life lived lends 
unique and interesting features to heretofore impermeable musical structures.  
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